Corporate Distress and Restructuring with Macroeconomic
Fluctuations: The Cases of GM and Ford
Introduction
The Basel Capital Accord of 2004 has focused attention on credit risk evaluation based on quantitative models for credit scoring and estimation of the probability of default for firms. Banking crises in a number of countries during the 1990s triggered research on the role of the macroeconomic environment in corporate defaults. Since macroeconomic effects on firms' cash flows as well as values are uncontroversial, it can be expected that macroeconomic fluctuations affect the probability that a particular firm will default in the near future. Furthermore, it is well known that default rates fluctuate with the business cycle. 2 Although it is accepted that the macro-economy affect default rates and the degree to which credit risk can be diversified, it does not follow that default prediction models on the firm level and credit risk-scoring models will be improved by inclusion of macroeconomic factors. 3 Several of the most used default prediction models reviewed below employ factors that themselves depend on macroeconomic conditions along with firm and industry specific conditions 4 . There is little doubt, however, that predictions of the default rate in an industry or the economy as a whole can be improved by inclusion of macroeconomic factors.
One difficulty in using macroeconomic factors for predictive purposes on the firm level is that firms differ greatly in their sensitivities to macroeconomic events both in terms of type of events they are sensitive to, and in terms of strength. There is not yet 3 much analysis of whether the most widely used default prediction models like Altman's Z-score models, and the KMV-model based on option pricing theory, would improve by inclusion of independent macroeconomic factors. The relevant macroeconomic factors would most likely vary across firms or, at a minimum the weights of different factors would be firm-specific.
In this paper we take a commonly used default prediction model and ask whether and how the firm-specific scores produced by the model can be decomposed into components explained by macroeconomic factors, and components capturing "intrinsic factors". By intrinsic we mean that the factors reflect firms' inherent competitiveness based on firms-and industry specific conditions. The objective of the decomposition is to provide information to a lender or corporate management about the relative weights of macro-economic and intrinsic factors in the default prediction. This information could be useful for management considering different strategies for restructuring, as well as for creditors trying to evaluate the long-term viability of the firm's operations. We argue that if distress is caused primarily by macroeconomic factors, a firm's intrinsic capacity to survive in the market place in the longer term is high in most cases and restructuring should enhance the value of existing operations. On the other hand, if macroeconomic factors do not play a strong role the appropriate response to distress may be more radical transformation or shutting down of operations. output and inflation affect the term structure of credit spreads. 7 We suggest an approach to decomposition of default predictions based only on observable price variables. These variables are easily observed and they signal or reveal information about underlying disturbances. Non-price variables, like aggregate output, are observable only with a substantial lag. Since up to date information about changes in default predictions is likely to be essential for management in times of approaching distress, there is value to using price variables as signals to the extent possible. The approach is based on MUST (Macroeconomic Uncertainty Strategy) analysis, a tool for assessing a firm's intrinsic competitiveness and macroeconomic exposures. 8 In the empirical analysis we have chosen to decompose the commonly used Altman's Z-scores as predictor of default into macroeconomic and intrinsic components but the approach can equally well be used for other predictors. The changes in Z-scores for GM and Ford are used to illustrate the approach and to show how the decomposition provides information about the appropriate approach for a lender or management to resolve a distress situation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss how macroeconomic and intrinsic factors affect near-term relative to long-term default probabilities to different degrees and implications for approaches to distress resolution. Section 3 contains a review of different types of models for forecasting default and the role of macroeconomic factors in these models. The approach to decomposition of changes in credit risk into macroeconomic and intrinsic components is discussed in Section 4. The case studies of GM's and Ford's Z-scores are presented in Section 5.
Conclusions follow in Section 6.
Macroeconomic Factors in Distress Prediction and Resolution
Any proxy (DP) for the default probability of a firm must refer to a certain time horizon.
In general this horizon is relatively short. Over a time horizon up to a year it makes little difference for the accuracy of the DP whether a firm's potential distress is caused by intrinsic factors reflecting the long run competitiveness of the firm or by macroeconomic factors that over the long run average to zero. Over the longer term current macroeconomic conditions are likely to be reversed and change independently of management's actions. Thus, if a high near-term DP is caused primarily by macroeconomic factors, the longer term default probability need not be very high while, if the high near term DP is caused by intrinsic factors, the longer term default probability 5 is likely to be even higher unless management initiates substantial restructuring of the firm's assets.
We assume that there is a proxy, DP, for the probability of default of a firm for a specific time horizon and this proxy reflects the value of the firm's equity with an error.
( Macroeconomic factors, on the other hand, are not subject to control by management.
They are also mean-reverting and on average their influence on V is zero. This assumption is consistent with observations of mean reversion in stock markets.
Expressing the proxy for default probability as a function of intrinsic and macroeconomic factors, provides
(2) DP = f(I, M) + ε, Where the weights of I and M in DP depend on the time horizon of the default prediction.
M can be a major factor in the short term but the longer the time horizon the lower is the weight of M likely to be. In this expression positive values for both I and M should be interpreted as negative factors from the point of firm value and probability of default.
Thus an increase in I could be caused by a decline in operational efficiency and an increase in M could be caused by a decline in aggregate output in the economy. We can think of he default probability over a specific horizon as depending on a weighted average of I and M. Thus, the proxy DP can be expressed as follows:
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(3) DP = aI + (1-a)M + ε.
The weight, a, would be increasing the longer the time-horizon of the prediction.
Considering that I is subject to permanent shifts while M tends to revert to zero we can write the expression for DP as (4) DP t = a(I t-1 +w t ) + (1-a)(δM t-1 +v t ) + ε t ,
where w and v are shift variables and δ is the serial correlation coefficient. The change in DP from one period to another can be expressed as
This expression states that an observed unanticipated change in the proxy for default probability may have been caused by a shift in the intrinsic factor, w, a shift in the unanticipated component of the macro-factor, v, or a change in the random error term. In addition, anticipated changes could have been caused by anticipated changes in macroeconomic conditions.
In general DP is based on market and accounting data for a firm and these data reflect both intrinsic and macroeconomic conditions. Observation errors (ε) also affect the observed DP relative to the actual default probability. Even if an observed DP based on market and accounting date captures default probability with reasonable accuracy over the near term the long run implications depend on the source of the observed change. To the extent an observed change in DP depends on macroeconomic factors, a reversion can be expected over the longer term.
In Section 4 we will decompose observed changes in a proxy for DP into intrinsic and macroeconomic components. Any change in DP can be considered a signal to management, as well as to shareholders and creditors, that action is necessary. The appropriate action may depend on the cause of the change in DP, however.
In order to discuss implications of a decline in DP for management and other stakeholders we consider the following types of possible methods for distress resolution or reduction in default probability:
1. Bankruptcy with liquidation of assets as under Chapter 7 in the US Bankruptcy Code.
Bankruptcy under rehabilitation procedures such as Chapter 11 in the US Bankruptcy
Code.
3. Change of management through hostile takeover, shareholder or board action 4. Substantial asset restructuring involving, for example, sale of assets, reorientation of strategy, partial closing of operations, etc.
5. Liability restructuring involving substantial changes in capital structure including reduced dividend pay-out, debt rescheduling and debt forgiveness.
In the following we discuss how information about intrinsic and macroeconomic sources of change in the default probability in combination with leverage can be used by management, shareholders, creditors or courts to assess which approach to distress resolution is appropriate or, under less critical circumstances, how a further increase in the default probability can be avoided. The approaches are not all mutually exclusive.
One may argue that any firm should deploy assets, choose strategy and choose a capital structure in accordance with shareholder wealth maximization. If markets for credit also work well creditors' and shareholders' interests are aligned.
However, conflicts of interest arise as a result of information and monitoring costs. Asset deployment decisions, as well as capital structure decisions are often irreversible to a degree in the sense that changes are associated with substantial costs. Even if they are not irreversible, management may have a vested interest in current strategies and decisions it has made. If insolvency is associated with costs for shareholders and management an increase in the default probability can induce the board or management to reevaluate the costs and benefits of the current course.
1. Bankruptcy with liquidation. Bankruptcy occurs when the present value of the cash flows generated by a firm's assets is less than the value of the firm's debt. In the bankruptcy literature "financial distress" is described as the situation when the present value of a the cash flows generated by a firm's assets is greater than the scrap value of the assets but less than the value of debts. 9 Under this condtion the firm is insolvent and the value of equity is negative. Thus, creditors cannot be expected to be paid back fully. It is 8 in their interest, however, to maximize the value of the assets by having them redeployed and managed in such a way that the present value of future cash flows are maximized.
If the present value of the cash flows generated by the assets is less than the value that can be obtained by piece by piece sale of the assets, liquidation is clearly the only efficent resolution of distress. In the literature this situation is sometimes denoted "economic distress." Even the debt-free firm is insolvent in this situation. It is naturally a situation creditors in a leveraged firm would like to avoid but as soon as insolvency is reached shareholders with limited liability do not have incentives to avoid a further deterioration of the firm's situation. As a result, it may lie in the interest of creditors to force a firm into bankruptcy with liquidation already in financial distress. In this situation the whole business or viable parts of it can be sold to new owners who can deploy and manage the assets better than current owners. 10
Liquidation is clearly an appropriate response to financial distress (insolvency with debt) if the distress is caused primarily by intrinsic factors and current owners are considered unable to redeploy and manage assets more productively. Under Chapter 11 the incentives to seek bankruptcy protection can be strong even if intrinsic factors are the major cause of distress since commitments to labor or other stakeholders with claims can be renegotiated. In this case it lies in the interest of the court to determine whether distress is caused primarily by macroeconomic factors or whether the firm is trying to avoid consequences of prior commitments or liability for damages it has caused.
As long as the firm's equity value is not close to zero shareholders and management have incentives to take actions in response to an increased likelihood of distress to avoid direct and indirect bankruptcy costs. Even in this case the appropriate actions depend on the weight of intrinsic and macroeconomic factors.
3. Change of management. An increased probability of default caused by macroeconomic factors can be blamed on management only under specific circumstances. Specifically, a highly leveraged firm is likely to be relatively sensitive to macroeconomic conditions.
The benefits of changing management in response to an increased probability of default are not likely to be large as long as intrinsic factors do not contribute to the increased probability. On the other hand, an increased probability caused by intrinsic factors can be interpreted as a signal that assets are deployed poorly or that strategies are not executed well. In this case shareholders as well as creditors would want to change management.
Management can be entrenched, however, with the result that only a takeover makes a change in management possible. In the extreme case when a takeover is not feasible, bankruptcy is the last opportunity to change management.
4. Substantial asset restructuring. A takeover usually implies that the incumbent management team is ousted. Thus, the team has an incentive to do what's necessary to avoid that the firm becomes a takeover target. In accordance with the discussion above, observation of an increasing default probability caused by intrinsic factors can be seen as a signal to management that substantial asset restructuring is necessary. This restructuring can be more or less far-reaching depending on level and rate of change of the default probability.
5. Liability restructuring. Any increase in the default probability should always be taken seriously and management can never be complacent with respect to the deployment of assets. However, if the increase is caused by macroeconomic factors and it reaches an uncomfortable level it should be taken as a signal that the capital structure of the firm is inappropriate in the macroeconomic environment. Either leverage should be reduced or macroeconomic risk management needs to be strengthened.
Predicting corporate default
In this section, different type of credit scoring models will be discussed from the perspective of their intent and capacity to recognize the influence of macroeconomic factors in the estimation of credit risk. From his original sample of 66 firms (of which 33 did go bankrupt) Altman observed that, in general, firms with a Z-score greater than 2.99 did not go bankrupt and firms with a Z-score below 1.81 went bankrupt within a year. Firms with Z-scores in between were in the "grey area".
Altman's Z-score model
There is no independent role of macroeconomic variables in the Z-score model. The variables constituting the score are affected by firm-and industry specific, as well as macroeconomic conditions. Thus, the contribution of intrinsic versus macroeconomic factors to a low z-score cannot be observed directly.
Over the years Altman has presented modified versions of the Z-score. The Z'-score for non-traded firms substitutes book values for market values in the X 4 -factor.
Another version, the Z''-score model, does not include the X 5 -variable. This model is often used in emerging markets. The original model has also been updated resulting in a ZETA-score model available on a proprietary basis.
In this paper we employ the original Z-score model and take the Z-scores as 
Models introducing explicit macroeconomic factors
CreditPortfolioView is a risk assessment model developed by Wilson 22 and adopted by
McKinsey. It relates the default probability for a firm in an industry to changes in country-and industry-specific variables. The model assumes that the default probability follows a logit distribution:
(7) P j,t = 1 / (1 + e -Yj,t ),
Where P j,t is the probability of default for country/industry j in period t, and Y j,t is an index value from a multi-factor model wherein country-and industry-specific factors are introduced. Using logit estimation, coefficients expressing the contribution of each factor to the probability of default within an industry can be estimated. Since the analysis is performed on the industry level it is assumed that firms within an industry are homogeneous with respect to impact of macroeconomic variables. 
Decomposing Z-values into Intrinsic and Macroeconomic components.
The default prediction models discussed so far use a set of macroeconomic factors that contribute to default prediction across all firms or all firms within an industry, and to the construction of diversified portfolios with low aggregate risk. We here emphasize that macroeconomic exposure is firm-specific. Our objective is thus to identify specific macroeconomic factors that affect a firm's default probability in order to gain information about the appropriate restructuring strategy in an approaching distress situation. For this purpose the macroeconomic factors should be observable without much time lag and with sufficient frequency for management and lenders to be able to update the information. Generally, price variables including interest and exchange rates are observed more or less continuously without a lag.
We develop a relatively simple method for decomposing credit scores or estimated default probabilities into macroeconomic and "intrinsic" components based on frequently observable variables. As discussed in Section 2, lenders and management need to determine whether to focus on liability restructuring or more fundamental asset restructuring that could include seeking court supervised liquidation.
Among the papers referred to above, Pesaran et al. is most similar in its intent to explain how macroeconomic factors contribute to default risk estimates based on the Merton Model. 26 We decompose Z-scores instead. Recent evidence indicates that the Z-score model has out-performed the KMV model during recent years. 27 Another difference between our approach and other approaches to introducing macroeconomic factors is that we focus entirely on price variables as opposed to quantity variables like output, employment, and demand conditions, and we allow the relevant price variables to differ across firms. As noted, the reason for focusing on price variables is that they can be observed more or less continuously while many other macroeconomic indicators are published on a quarterly basis with substantial lags.
Frequent and up to date information about changes in default probabilities can be essential for decisions about how to approach underlying problems.
Price variables, like interest rates, exchange rates, and goods prices are expected to serve as signals of underlying shocks. Presumably, they respond in a systematic way to underlying monetary and real shocks on the macro-and lower levels.
Therefore, they can be used to disentangle the nature of shocks.
Altman's original Z-score model can be transformed to incorporate the sensitivity of the firm to different macroeconomic factors influencing the firm. To be able to observe the sensitivity of the firm to macroeconomic variables we decompose the Zscore into two parts 28 : 26 (8) Z i,t = Z I,i,t + Z M,i,t
In the above expression Z i,t is the total Z-score of company i at time t according to
Altman's Z-score model, Z I,i,t is the intrinsic part of the Z-score of company i at time t and Z M,i,t is the part of the Z-score that depends on macroeconomic fluctuations. The Zscore model can be expressed in the following way:
(9) Z I,i,t + Z M,i,t = .012 X 1,i,t + .014 X 2,i,t + .033 X 3,i,t + .006 X 4,i,t + .999 X 5,i,t
We expect that each of the Z-score factors, X 1,i,t through X 5,i,t , are sensitive to macroeconomic fluctuations. Each of them can be decomposed into an intrinsic and a macroeconomic component. An alternative approach, that will be used below, is to decompose Z t directly without decomposing the factors X 1 -X In the following we will only be using the component factors to calculate the Zvalue in each period. Thereafter we will estimate effects of macroeconomic variables on changes in Z before decomposing these Z-changes in intrinsic and macroeconomic components.
We choose to use the MUST-approach to identify macroeconomic factors influencing firms' Z-values. 29 The focus in this approach is on macroeconomic price variables; exchange rates, interest rates and inflation rates, i.e. changes in price levels. As noted, price variables are observable by analysts without long lags, and they aggregate information about unobservable, underlying shifts in demand and supply. 30 The approach involves seeking the relevant factors and their weights for each individual firm, starting from a set of variables that are chosen a priori based on each firm's identification of relevant macroeconomic variables and on information about production structure, relevant markets, and the origin of major competitors.
The extent to which changes in Z in a period depends on changes in macroeconomic factors can be expressed in the following way:
(12) dZ M,i,t = ((δZ M,i )/(δe)) • de t +((δZ M,i )/(δi)) •di t + ((δZ M,i )/(δp))•dp t In this expression de t , di t , and dp t represent changes in exchange rates, interest rates and price levels during a period. The partial derivatives show the sensitivity of the Z-score to changes in the macroeconomic factors. A particular firm may very well be affected by domestic as well as foreign macroeconomic factors, at different sensitivities.
Econometrically, the macroeconomic influences on the Z-scores are identified in regressions with changes in Z-scores as the dependent variables and macroeconomic as well as industry and firm-specific variables as independent variables in order to account for possible correlation between macro economic factors and factors that affect firms' intrinsic credit risk.
In the next section we use Z-scores for GM and Ford to illustrate how the relevant macroeconomic price variables can be identified, and how changes in Z-scores can be decomposed period by period.
Decomposition of Z-score changes for GM and Ford. Can they survive?
In this section we begin by calculating the quarterly Z-scores for GM and Ford for the The variables that together build up the Z-score were obtained from GM's and Ford's quarterly statements. The variables, defined in Section 2, are individually likely to depend on macroeconomic factors but, as mentioned, we choose to decompose the Z-score itself rather than its components.
The levels of the quarterly Z-scores are presented in column 1 of Table 1 for GM and in Table 2 for Ford. GM's score has fluctuated between -.07 and +1. The however. Altman has later concluded that the rule of thumb stating that bankruptcy is 20 very likely within a year if the score falls below 1.8, does not apply to very large corporations like GM and Ford. 31 There is no doubt the scores are very low, however, and that they indicate a high probability of bankruptcy for both corporations throughout the period.
For the purposes here, we focus on changes in the Z-scores in the columns "Z-changes" rather than the levels in order to determine what kind of distress the two firms have been moving towards. The average quarterly change for GM in Table 1 is -.013 with a standard deviation of .20. The corresponding figures for Ford in Table 2 are -.005 and .15. Thus the accumulated change for the period for GM is approximately -.51
and for Ford the accumulated change is -.2. There is a downward trend in the Z-score for both firms as shown in Figures 1 and 2 . The standard deviations of quarterly changes are large for both firms but it is lower for Ford. This observation implies that it is more meaningful to talk about a trend in the case of Ford than in the case of GM. Figure 1 shows that most of the drop in GM's Z-score occurred before 1998 while most of the decline in Ford's Z-score occurred during the period 1998-2001.
Two regressions for changes in Z-scores for each firm are presented in Tables 3 and 4 . In Table 3 , a number of potentially important exchange rates, interest rates, price levels, and commodity price changes are included. As noted, annual reports for the two firms were used to identify which country variables to include in each regression. For both companies we have included macroeconomic variables for the Euroarea, Japan and the USA. In addition, UK, Australian and Brazilian price variables are included for Ford, because these countries are identified in Ford's annual report. These countries are important for the firm either as a production, market or competitor location.
The relative prices included are the producer price index relative to the consumer price index (PPI and CPI are introduced separately), the world market oil price and, for Ford, the price of aluminium. Instead of PPI/CPI we could have included the relative price for motor vehicles as an industry specific price variable but the two relative prices are highly correlated and the components of PPI/CPI is easily accessible. Lags of independent variables were introduced as well but they did not improve results.
It can be debated whether the oil price should be considered an industry specific variable or a macro variable. It is certainly a variable beyond the firms' influence but the car manufacturers are able to adjust in many ways to changes in it. If this adjustment takes longer than the time-horizon we are concerned with, the oil price should be considered a macroeconomic factor rather than an intrinsic one for the purposes here. It turns out in Table 3 that The results of the regressions are presented in Table 3 . As a result of high correlation among several macroeconomic variables a subset of the price variables are sufficient to identify the macroeconomic impact on the Z-scores. In the results of the stepwise regressions presented in Table 4 we have used a significance level of 5% as our selection criteria. In the following we discuss and use the results for the second set of regressions in Table 4 where most of the coefficients are significant. The adjusted Rsquares are higher in this table while the Durbin-Watson statistic remains acceptable.
In Table 4 , it is clear that Ford is subject to much more varied macroeconomic influences than GM. While Ford's Z-score is sensitive to one exchange rate (Euro), two interest rates (USA and Japan), four CPIs (Japan, UK, USA, and EMU) and three PPIs We turn now to the decomposition of the Z-scores and the changes of these scores in Table 1 for GM and Table 2 for Ford. The columns "Z-change macro" are obtained by multiplying the regression coefficients in Table 4 with actual changes in the macroeconomic variables for each period. The far right column in Tables 1 and 2 Looking at the average quarterly changes for the period it can be seen that the accumulated macro effect on GM's score is small while the accumulated macro effect explains most of the Z-score change for Ford. The standard deviations of quarterly changes are quite large for both macro effects and residual, intrinsic effects.
To observe the developments during the period more clearly we have constructed Figures 1 and 2 , where the macro effects on the Z-scores have been deducted from the Z-scores in levels. 32 Thus, the dotted lines show our estimates of intrinsic Zscores.
There is a clear difference in the developments of the intrinsic Z-scores. For GM the total Z-score and the intrinsic Z-score move together over the period as a whole.
For Ford, on the other hand, the intrinsic Z-score does not have much of a trend while the total Z-score does. In other words, most of the changes in Ford's Z-score is explained by macroeconomic factors.
Finally, we interpret the results in light of the discussion of approaches to increasing default probabilities. The generally low levels of the Z-scores imply that both firms are in need of restructuring of some kind. Focusing on the events during our data period, the changes in the Z-scores for GM caused by intrinsic factors would indicate that GM is in urgent need of asset restructuring involving sale of assets, re-evaluation of strategies or increases operational efficiency. Ford's Z-scores for the period indicates that macroeconomic factors explain most of the increased default probability. Thus, it seems that Ford's leverage is excessive relative to its sensitivity to macroeconomic factors or it needs to enhance its approach to risk management. The generally low Z-scores for Ford indicate that asset restructuring should be considered as well although the urgency for Ford is less than for GM.
Conclusions
We Altman's Z-score was used as the indicator of default probability for firms in an illustration of the practical use of the method of decomposition. The Z-scores for GM and Ford were calculated and the quarterly changes during the period 1997-2005
were decomposed into macroeconomic and intrinsic components. Both GM's and Ford's Z-scores fell during the period with substantial variation from quarter to quarter. The decomposition indicated that the decline in GM-score was explained by intrinsic factors while the decline in Ford's Z-score was explained mainly by macroeconomic factors although the accumulated decline for Ford was larger.
The implications for restructuring are that the need for fundamental asset restructuring at GM was urgent in 2005 while Ford's need for asset restructuring did not worsen. Ford should consider whether its leverage is excessive or whether its approach to macroeconomic risk management can be improved. 
